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We've thought a lot about what to say today and some of the discussions
that need to be covered. We see this group as terribly important to what
ultimately is determined to be both private and state policy for the State of
Florida. We also believe, as in business, that if we don't happen to select
the right solution, we may not have the time to do it right -� if the
pressures are great enough -- but we will find the time to do it over. The
thing about choosing the wrong solution is that the problem will still be
there and we'll have the fun of readjusting it.
So I'm trying to be very clinkal and philosophical about this whole
thing and say it's better to get along and be able to communicate and work
with people, than it is necessarily to be totally candid and say what you
really think. And then you think about it a little bit longer and you realize·
that, at your. age, you're going to be around to do it over, if it has to be
done over, and so you come back in favor of the more candid approach. What I
am going to say will probably alienate all the interests in the room at one
point in the talk. So at least there will be some equity.
Let me just begin with a few personal and hopefully light-hearted
comments before I get into the body of the talk. I think it's a little ironic
and somewhat humorous that Blue Cross and Blue Shield which has been opposing
formal rate-setting, but favoring the Cost Containment Board's revjew and
disclosure activity, should be seen as somehow rather in the pocket of or
controlled by providers or trying to protect its own hidden self interests
such as one new one I've heard about that you really have a discount, but no
one else knows it and somehow or other that will come out, which, of course,
is false. But that because somehow or other we have this special interest, we
oppose rate-setting.
The reason I find that ironic is because the two states that are most
frequently cited as models of rate-setting are Maryland and Connecticut. And,
of course, in Maryland the hospitals aggressively pursue rate-setting as a way
of getting more revenue out of Blue Cross. And that was not a hidden agenda,
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that was a formal public statement.. And in Connecticut, the Connecticut Blue
Cross never pays r1hat the rate-setting Cammission sets, but rather they
negotiate their own rates which are almost in every case below the
Commission's. So, from our standpoint we should be so lucky as to go to
rate-setting and get the Maryl and discount as all party-payor systems call for
when we can justify it economically, and quite obviously, we believe we can't.
Number two is we are acting on behalf of our subscribers, and we want a
sound health care system, but not necessarily a lavish one.
Number three, we believe, more than anything else, that there is a need
to facilitate innovation, and change the current adversarial relationship that
exists in large measure as regulatory agencies are put on the point and told
to so�ehow or other make things better for the public. Because they are
forced into that posture, it is inevitable that they adopt the regulatory
approach.
Now, at the current time, the only rate-setting authority exists in the
State Department of Insurance. As we have talked about earlier, to many
people in the public, that's an equation with higher health care costs and
higher insurance costs one and the same. And I believe this group even
expressed that by a margin of two-thirds, one-third. Therefore, why not, if
-you're trying to control health care costs, why not regulate or control health
insurance costs?
Well, the problem is, as I'll show you later on, that the insurance
industry is not making a bunch of money off the health insurance field. And
as you pressure them, you of course distract them. They worry about things
like surviving, and therefore they don't worry about innovation. So if you
really want to facilitate change in the marketplace, which is what I had
understood this Task Force is supposed to look at -- competition and consumer
choice -- then I think the regulatory agencies need to both facilitate
informed buying by the cons�mers as well as facilitate the insurers,
coalitions,· and others, meeting that consumer need, by facilitating change.
There is a big difference between facilitation and innovation, and an
adversarial regulatory relationship. And that's not a comment about people or
personalities, it's a comment about the system and the way the system works
today. I also think that we are threatened by the false hope and promise of
going to rate-setting, which will not be self correcting; that is, if it
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doesn t work the next step wi11 be, "well, you know we ve got the rates down,
but utilization is high, so let's get that utilization program going and
control that. A11 th� while, the agency assigned to do the work is assigned
the job of evaluating of its own performance. And not too many such
organizations are overwhelmingly critical of their performance. So large
employers in our view in Florida will be served no matter what. I think it's
also ironic, right now, that there are some in the hospital industry here that
are looking at rate-setting and saying "Hey, that may protect my income, my
revenue, my position." Not realizing that, as far as I'm concerned� the horse
is out of the barn in terms of competitive initiatives. There will be
competition and there will be competition choices, unless severe regulatory
pressures are brought to bear, which are probably beyond the state's capacity
to do. And that's because of the freedom of large employers through ERISA and
self-insurance to not worry about what the state agencies say or do. If they
can, and properly so, negotiate better deals to meet their responsibilities to
their employees and themselves, they're going do it and they are going to be
the driving force for change.
It's kind of hard to view it this way, but I see from my early days of
being an economic analyst, I see a tremendous parallel between the hospital
industry and the cost of energy. And for awhile there was pain with the cost
of gasoline and then there was an agreement that I really didn't need to drive
that gas hog. But I loved it for a very long time before I decided I didn't
need it. And the thing that changed my mind was the price of the gas not the
regulation which, caused me almost not to have any.
I believe in this case, that large employers, and I've talked to a large
number of them, and as a matter of fact I was with a half a dozen of them for
several days recently, that they are preoccupied with the need to get relief.
And they're going to get relief. And a lot of the things that are very
attractive to us, such as cancelling coverage for dependents, which is a very
strong force in the market by the way, individuals because Florida is so much
as I'll get into later, employers pay for the employees not their dependents.
Families are cancelling coverage for their dependents. The only trouble is
when mom is in the hospital and father has to go to work, he goes to his
employer and says, "Do you have a few hundred?" because in order for him to
stay employed and keep his family group together, he needs relief, he needs
help, and he frequently turns to the e�ployer.
I
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So some of the programs that ca 11 for large sacrifice 11 from subscribers
and employees, number one, do not recognize the sacrifice they're already
making out of their own pocket, and number two, do not recognize the role
large employers are going to play in breaking that issue open.
Those are some of the summary and early comments that I wanted to make.
What I like to do now would be to summarize the Plan's position on dealing
with the cost problem. Beyond what I said in an introductory sense, change is
occurring in a very profound way. Some further just very brief introductory
comments are that Medicare has changed. For us to fail to recognize DRG
reimbursement in private or government program planning for the 80 1 s, I think
would be insane. And I still hear talk about mechanisms of rate-se_tting,
including all of the work done by the Cost Containment Board, which does not
recognize DRGs. So there is a very practical, technical question about 51% of
the admissions and days in Florida being Medicare admissions and days, how can
you talk about either innovating in the private sector or in the government
sector without also talking about dealing with the changes that are coming
through the DRG form of reimbursement? Secondly, there will be, at the
margin, changes made in large employer plans and other prograQS. So one of
our questions is, do we want to leverage the change that's already in the
system and work with it, or do we want to go a different way?
Our view is that what is needed are widely available competitive
suppliers, in both delivery and financing alternatives, in a competitive and
unregulated environment. Not only are the things such as DRGs changing, but
the number of physicians in the community is changing dramatically.
Nationwide there is a tremendous increase, and in the southeast there is even
a sharper increase.
We believe that competition is the only viable form that will ensure
innovation in health care delivery and financing and create incentives that
will lead to efficiency and productivity.
We believe it's the state's role to promote a market or business climate
that promotes the above. Regulation is a barrier to its achievement, that is,
of innovation. It stifles and restricts it. If you're worried about whether
you're going to survive, be it insurer or hospital, you try to deal with that
issue first and then after that, to the degree you have resources available,
you work on other issues. What is needed is a cooperative approach.
II
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I believe that it is an inevitable result, with the current frustration
over health care costs,_that if you create a situation where-you say to a
regulatory agency, you make it better", then you create a situation where it
must be an adversarial relationship. I might also add that from a private
business management standpoint, it is the general feeling that if you don't
have the support of the people working within the context of the control
system, they find a way to beat it.
We will work on behalf of our subscribers in any environment to-make it
as cost effective as possible. Simply stated, if the ultimate decision of the
legislature is to go to rate regulation, we will work in that context. We
don't think it's the right way to go, we think it will restrict the
innovations, but we'll do the best we can under those circumstances.
Therefore, we recommend the following: first of all from a price
standpoint, and I'll get into the reasons behind all of this as we go along,
deregulate providers and insurers. One of the things that people seem to be
saying is that there is a windfall out there for the insurance industry and if
health care costs come down they are going to capture that windfall and that's
really terrible. Well, I'll show you some operating data a little later in
the talk.
But we would offer a second proposal which is that if you want to do
something, be sure that the insurer has adequate funds to compete and pay his
bills. And·then put through an excess profits law. If, as a matter of state
policy, you don 1 t want any insurer making a contribution to surplus for risk
and contingency of more than five percent, which I think is the auto insurance
standard, then put that in, or some other standard. And say, after the fact,
11 D0 the best job you can; you're entitled to something for that effort.
But
after that point, end it. And do away with all of the burden and the
bureaucracy and the use of resources, trying to defend future events that no
one is certain what they're going to be, and trying to make the public better
in anticipation of that.
Number three, establish a Governor's Commission, or extend this one,
w�ich will do a comprehensive research study. We think there is one very
important thing that has not been done so far. This has been essentially a
collection of viewpoints and opinions. It has been worked in terms of this
group of diverse interests, working together effectively to try to process
11
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that information. And I think the people and the staff should be commended
for that. But what it has not been is a quantitative, fact-oriented analysis
of Florida's health care delivery and financing.
There is not assembled a set of facts that are generally accepted as the
authoritive set of facts on the Florida situation. And when you get the
simple questions like, "Did the insurers make a lot of money last year or
didn't they? 11 this commission has no informed opinion on that subject. And
if I present data, unless people with a different point of view have a chance
to validate that data, then they will not accept it as authoritative.
Now the forum that I'm talking about is one that was brought up when
Buddy McKay's commission first got started. A suggestion was made which I
strongly endorsed, that a group like the Research Triangle Institute or some
other formal group, engage themselves in a consulting relationship with such
as Bell and this commission to prepare and obtain and present factual
information.
� I think it also is in our long-run interest to do something about the
fact that Florida universities do not have, apparently today, proven capacity,
nationally recognized capacity, to do that work as I understand it. Down the
road we need that capability as one of the largest states in the union. It's
unfortunate that I mention the University of North Carolina or some other
group to do that kind of work. So I think that finding it in the context of a
school of health care administration or public health or whatever would be
important.
We are prepared to participate in and provide significant funding to an
effort of that kind. We understand that traditionally the problem has been on
this subject, "Oh well, you'll get it through one part of the legislature, but
you won't get it through the other because people aren't going to be willing
to pay for it. Well, I c�n assure you that we are prepared to make a
significant contribution to the funding of such an effort. And I think that a
joint private/public funding would be a very desirable event, because I think
it would create ownership of the statistics and results and the information.
We also would recommend an oversight committee in the legislature that
would ensure growth of competitive alternatives. The State Insurance
Department could adopt a facilitating role in promoting the growth and report
annually to the committee on the growth of these various alternativ� measures.
,
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Ensure that other gov�rn�ental agencies adopt a facilitating role and
recognize that some risk taking has to occur. You can't say, "I don't want
anyone to be hurt, but I do want innovation." They're mutually exclusive.
And if it's not acceptable to ever have a mistake or ever have something not
work, then you ca� assure yourself that you're go ing to have the status quo.
As I will point out later, and I think we have facts on each one of these
recommendat ions, that we believe there should be an elimination of mandated
benefits to provide insurers the freedom to meet market needs. What is
happening right now is there are two tiers to the market. There are those
people who can get the self-insurance� I'm talking to eraployers as small as
one hundred people who are self insuring, who are under third party
administrators; no one in state government even knows they exist, far less,
their having to worry about mandated benefits. I t is, from our standpo int,
far and away the most profound market movement of the last five years. Andi
think earlier evidence by the South Florida Coalition on the number of their
members who are self-insured, is a witness to that. And I believe the man
from Ryder made an eloquent explanation of the advantages that they derive
from being free from mandated benefits.
The state should adopt a prudent buyer position for Medicaid and use its
buying power to negotiate coverages for its people. Medicaid _should adopt a
DRG-type reimbursement system, and to begin and expand experimentation with a
variety of programs. We have, by the way, in my view, not even listed the
experiments and the innovations that other states are trying, far less
evaluated them. And I mention that as just one other example of why we
believe that a Governor's Cormnission is needed or some other group is needed
to do a comprehensive review.
We think you should monitor regulatory and market developments and
consider passing legislation to protect PPO and network development, similar
to that passed by the federal government for HMO development. And that is
something that says, "In the interest of these programs gro'fling, in the
interest of PPO programs growing as HMO programs were growing, to set aside
routine regulatory pressures on them in the interest of seeing them grow and
then evaluate their performance aft�r about a two-year period. And deal with
problems that are observed to have occurred in their development. But if you
11
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expect people to both find the way to develop PPOs, make them cost effective,
make them responsive to the market, and also deal with a highly complex
regulatory system, I think it reduces the chance of success.
Now those are the recommendations that are the result of a lot of
information that we are going to share with you, I hope the word isn't
"punish" you. But basically what we've felt we need to do is describe the
essential nature of the health care problem in Florida, to outline market
characteristics and the results of both the regulatory and competitive models,
to assess some of the distinctive Florida enviornmental factors, to
demonstrate that regulation is currently hurting the health insurers by
preventing them from innovating to meet market needs. And as I said earlier,
but Lester was out of the room, this is a system comment, not an observation
about people. It's an observation about public policy and the dynamics of
that policy. And to recommend specific marketplaci solutions which the public
and private sectors could implement to contain health care costs.
This is the problem statement that we agreed to some time back. Costs
are too high and are out of control and unacceptable. We would like to share
with you a few slides from some studies we've done. Corporate opinion
survey: Which of the following can do the most to keep down the cost of
health and medical care? (That "government" not necessarily being the state,
but all forms of government. ) Which of these has contributed most to rising
health care and medical costs? Hopitals 47%, doctors 46%, insurers 28%,
government programs 20%, improved care 11%, and individuals 10%. -So
politically, what should be done is really sort of clear. The government,
which is seen as most powerful in that first slide, and the hospital which is
seen as most responsible by a little bit, the second slide, should go together
and we would regulate.
Now as far as it being out of control and being a serious problem, I
would like.to show you a slide on our own corporate data on our rate
increases. One of the things that troubles us at every meeting, is when
people talk about the rising cost of health care, what indicator to use? As
an insurer, I care about what people pay for health care in total. I don't
care about just per diem rates or adjusted cost per admission, or some other
factor. Because as we talked about at our last meeting, there are a lot of
ways of squeezing the balloon. If you squeeze one part of i� and it pops out
in higher utilization, you haven't saved money.
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Now this is a combination of two factors. This thirty plus percent
increase for three years, is coming down a little bit, reflects revenu�s of
hospitals going up about 22% a year, plus the utilization in other services,
plus to some degree healthy people dropping insurance and getting out of the
market. That is, we see a general adverse selection occurring, as people drop
coverages, particularly small groups and individuals. Dropping coverage as
they make judgments that at the current premium, it's not worth the price.
The reason we say it's out of control is the inevitable result of that is down
the road there is a collapse in the marketplace and thus the availability of
coverage in terms of responsible coverage, meaning so�e reasonable amount of
the premiums going for claims, we think that that is threatened by this
continued trend.
We have two other charts on consumer price index and the only point I
would make about this is that dramatic as they are, they all understate the
problem of health care costs. They don't overstate it, they understate it.
When charges went up 12%, revenues are going up 22%, they generally accept a
trend factor in the health insurance industry today of 25% for the cost of
·health insurance coverage. That means claims filed by one person for one year
will increase 25% each year. So none of these indicators adequately set what
that problem is all about.
Let's take a look at some admission data. Admissions per 1, 000
population, national and Florida data, and I believe this is age adjusted, but
I 'm not certain. They are remarkably similar, both the national and the
Florida data. Total expense per adjusted admission Florida (age adjusted) is
below the rate-setting states, which tend to be in the higher cost areas of
the northeast, and all states and the District of Columbia by a little bit.
Let's look at some of the causes behind the rate of increase in hospital
costs. General inflation as it factors into (this is from the Health Care
Financing Review) technology, population growth, and increased utilization
rates. One of the issues, of course, that we're mindful of in terms of this
group is, if we do set rates, will we simply reduce number of services, which
is rationing, or increase efficiency? Looking at some of these causes, of
course, helps us try to sort that out.
If you. look at Medicare and Medicaid, they're using a pro-competition
model, in the sense that they're setting a price irrespective of costs. Most
-9-

of the rate-setting commissions begin with saying, "We'll look at your costs
and if they're reasonable we'll allow them to pass through; and if they're
not, we'll do some kind of detailed review. " That does not necessarily have
an incentive for efficiency in it. In the case of states like Michigan and
California, lookipg at the Medicaid question, they are looking at a variety of
ways of achieving pressure on the provider to be more efficient. If you can
bid for the right to serve Medicaid patients and you get that service on a
capitation basis, meaning you're paid for the patient per month, and you
satisfy them, you get more patients. And if you don't satisfy them, you get
fewer patients.
The question that is before us, really, is how to leverage these Medicare
and Medicaid ·decisions into the total cost equation? Because they're nearly
two-thirds of the spending for hospital costs for care in Florida. I think
it's 51% plus 7%, if I remember correctly, for Medicare and Medicaid,
respectively. The problem with price regulation is that if you look at the
United States, look at New York and the other rate-setting states, New York
shows cl ear signs of capital deterioration by the hospitals. The key is, what
can be done to improve the efficiency of the system? And we believe that that
lies in creating incentives fbr efficiency.
We think that the experience of the Hospital Cost Containment Board shows
that the fnevitable result of that work is hospitals hiring professional
staffs to both analyze and present their case most effectively, and for the
most simple of all reasons, that ultimately their survival depends on it.
They also will hire expensive legislative representatives and other
-representatives to see to it that their interests are met as they try to work
themselves through a series of "policy clarifications. That is, as you get
rate-setting up, you can never give it the support of well thought out policy
on how to deal with special situations. And so those will get hammered out
over time. If they're hammered out favorably to the hospital industry's
viewpoint, costs will go up. If they're not, then the status quo will tend to
be supported.
We don't see at the present time, and we'll show you some data from
rate-setting states, that there is a. compelling justification to rush into
regulation. At the same time we think that the problem is clearly
unacceptable the way it is. We think that there is a window of opportunity to
11
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develop innovative programs that would involve consumers, hospitals,
· physicians, insurers, other third-party administrators, and alternative
delivery and financing systems. We think that that group is out there wanting
to do something. And the role of state governQent can either facilitate those
changes or can slow it up.
We've had a lot of discussion and Buddy McKay brought in Walter McClure
to talk about the market failure in the economy and in the health care portion
of the economy more precisely. We've talked about what is needed for
successful market mechanisms, and one part of it is informed consumers with
options to buy, and the other is price as the mechanism for allocating the
goods and services among the consumers. What's been the problem so far,
except for HMOs, is that price has not been the mechanism. If you read the
hospital literature and you talk to the man who is now a marketing director of
a hospital, he's talking about his two markets: physicians and patients. He
wants to market to both of them, and that 1 s his conflict, ·with the notion of
price competition, given today 1 s market mechanisms. I n the case of the HMO,
it has been proved to work in a sense that the individual puts the total
package together of his system of benefits, buys it essentially for a one-year
period. At the end of that one year, he makes a decision whether or not he
wants to continue. And that's something he can get his hands around, and
understand, and deal with, and make an informed judgment.
The variety of anxieties about whether you I re going to be ill, the
variety of availability of services among hospitals and physicians_, the
different health conditions of the patients, their ages, their circumstances,
all make it impossible to simply compete on the basis of price per unit of
service, where service is a laboratory test or a physician visit or a trip to
the hospital. It simply has not worked; it has not occurred.
I think that the belief is today that the HMO has acted in its own right
to generate a market segment; but also to educate the public, both consumers
and wholesale buyers -- namely employers -- that there are some other
options. I t is really out of both the success and the failure of HMOs that
these PPOs have gotten to be developed. Because they allow price competiton,
but you don't buy an entire delivery system.
We think this is the beginning of reform in the health care industry from
the standpoint of marketplace forces, because it brings in price. If you
- 11 -

don't have price competition, it is very hard to argue against rate
regulation. I don't think there is anything in between. You've got to have
one or the other. And you've got to have enough price competition that it
changes people's behavior. And that's got to be evident.
And .I think we need all the help we can get in doing it, and I think the
state has two very powerful roles as the operator of the Medicaid program and
as an operator of the largest employer-employee program in the state. And
those two roles, using those two points of leverage, I think they could make a
profound impact on the financing and delivery, by impacting on the
marketplace. They're already doing that by an active, supportive role for HMO
development, but I think that needs to extend to PPO development and other
forms of coverage, and I've already said, on the Medicaid side as well.
To have the decision maker for services free from the awareness of price,
largely having the decision made by a provider, simply is an apt description
of market failure. The choice, therefore, is between complete regulation and
active, aggressive work to improve the competitive marketplace. It is not a
choice of the status quo.
We've created a little visual that shows the strategies for health care
cost containment. There are people who are far more knowledgeable than I in
this audience who work the Washington scene. But as I basically understand
it, the reason that we are moving to voucher systems for ·Medicare, the reason
we are moving to DRG reimbursement, is because for Medicare these various
forms have been considered to have faiied.
It was not very hard in '73 and '74 to go to Washington and find people
who advocated regulation as the solution to the problem of rising Medicare
costs. But there are very few people today who believe that the regulation of
the last number of years has worked. And I find that especially interesting
because at the state level if you find under rate-setting that in fact you
have not controlled total cbsts, then you're forced to go, having already gone
to certificate of need, which I also will tell you didn't work (even though
people love it who worked at it and I was one of them) . You go from
certificate of need, you go to controlling hospital rates, you've only got one
thing left, you've got to control hospital utilization. You're going to have
to have a state agency to do it. And to say that you can get by with less
than that, I think is being less than fully candid.
-12-

Now on the bottom half there are many things that are shown, but the
basic issue is whether or not you negotiate, in meaningful tenns for your
buyers. Some of the things that are needed are advertising refonn. One of
the very popular issues, a program we have started now privately, is
directories by municipal area, of who it is that will live within certain
limits and those limits will be negotiated from year to year. And that makes
the consumer able to make choices. Now if they're not in terms of how he buys
care you have not helped him, so you better start with the physicians.
Alternative systems, whether they are PPOs or not, all imply negotiations.
Broader insurance offerings under certain conditions, where the provider is
combined with the consumer in trying to contro 1 -uti1ization rather than the
other way around.
Cost per adjusted admission, six states with mandatory rate-setting, 41
states without. Cost per adjusted patient day. I understand that if you take
New York state off of most of these indicators, the balance of those states
woul d be considerably higher. We are very concerned about squeezing the
ball oon, because we think if you control one item it'll just drive the
expenditure somewhere else. Health insurance costs will not have been
lowered, but public expectations that they should be lower will occur. If you
want the data I will dig it out.
But continuing with certificate of need, we look at certificate of need
in Florida. Our experience with it is very sifililar to that of a variety of
programs where consumer involvement has been great. They generate tremendous
public support. But the fact of the matter is, that the hospital bed supply
in Fl-0rida has risen more rapidly per thousand population in Florida than the
United States as a whole. So that we put certificate of need in, and the
result is we have regulation and we have raore beds. And being a former member
of a HSA board, and involved in planning, you know for many of these decisions
that the working committee may have said no, but somewhere along the line the
decisions have changed.
I'd like to talk briefly if I could move to the mandated benefits
section. The problem with mandated benefits is somebody comes into the
legislature and says, We operate more efficiently than those other guys and
if you will just require insurers to pay us, then costs will be down because
this is much more efficient. " The only trouble is it doen't work that way.
They get a new source of revenue, but the other costs that were in the system
remain there.
11
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We have a few of these that we thought might share with you some of the
h�rd data on. Alcohol and drug abuse rider. Net increase as near as we can
determine, $3. 50 a month� Now it may be socially desirable, that's the second
question, but if you're talking about cost, you say, Well, do you or don't
you let the public decide?"
Chiropractic rider which involves tremendous selection -- out of the
total population only a small fract{on of the people use it -- and those that
use it, use it extremely extensively. We have one very large group where
chiropractic services, I believe, is the second largest service that we pay
for. And people will come in and they will say, "Well, you know you can get
the coverage by doing these things, and then just come in once a week and
we'll take care of you." It's not altogether unknown also when you have an
80-20 coinsurance to say, "Don't worry about the 20%, " so you've now created
zero cost for the consumer to use his services.
One of the more dramatic ones came from Massachusetts data on outpatient
psychiatric care. In January of 1976 a broad out-patient psychiatric benefit
was mandated in the state of Massachusetts. Now that is the cost of millions
of dollars from about 7 million dollars to 45 million dollars in a small
number of years for that benefit. Now you don't get, comQon to popular
belief, some corresponding offset someplace else. So part of the increase in
cost as the consumer sees it, is in mandated benefits, because they're
essentially a creature of the 70's.
Talking about regulation in the industry: we have quality through
licensure and accreditation. We're talking about rate setting in Medicare.
In Medicare we have a DRG system which essentially has incentives built into
it. It� be beaten, and there is great concern it wil l be beaten. That's
the issue we have to deal with. How we would do that in a state program, I
think it should be recognized that there would be some form of utilization
review. I don't think you can consider one without the other. As I've
indicated to you earlier, certificate of need has not worked especially well.
I n my part of the state there is clearly a surplus of beds and yet there have
recently been filed several proposals for new hospital beds in the area.
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Yes. What we ' re really talking about is if somebody wanted to buy only x
services, we re trying to sell that ; we're all for somebody eval.uating that a
couple years later and saying, now we have some hard facts, to x, or y, or z.
You get this sort of intuitive reasoning that's led to ever broader building
blocks which is in my opinion clearly u ndesirabl e.
What I lik e to do is go to the underwriting results of the insurance
industry . We have more detailed information on our own company. But this is
published from the Argus Charts, which is a national publication for the
commercial insurance industry which has included Blue Cross data up until 1982
when they stopped issuing it . The data are essentially drawn from the blanks
that are filed with the State I nsura nce Department. It does not talk about
investment income, but obviously that is a factor. But certainly, if there
were a motivation behind people wanting to see a change in the way we do
business, it's that slide. Clearly, the industry would not be very threatened
by any reasonabl e upper limit on so-call ed profits, with that kind of a
history to it.
What I'd like to do no\t is hold the slides and go into a little bit of
what we think the benefits could be if we put more incentives into the
marketplace. First of all, we're talking about sel ective roll back of
regulations which discourage competition and innovation. We're talking about
using the buying power of large purchasers of health care services, such as
third-party administrator organizations, commercial ins u rers, employers, and
government. We think the incentive should be for prudent selection of
providers, by the individual consumers. That to us is the key. We support
cost sharing, public informati on, and awa reness. We do not believe that cost
sharing is the answer. If it were, how do you explain the success of HMOs?
We think today we understand that the alternatives are HMOs and PPOs, but
five years ago nobody thought about PPOs. And I believe if you allow these
developments to occu r, there will be new forms of coverages that are not being
thought of today, and therein lies the opportunity for real improvement. We
also think a great deal more can be done in the area of public education • .
We've done work on things like smoking with children in schools. I don't see
any reason why the issue of health care costs and incentives cannot be worked
at all levels from the general public through work of the Cost Containment
Board and other �, down through the school sys tems.
I
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If you look at what's happeni ng i n COQpetition iri other indu stries and
try to draw a parallel between that and the health care industry, some things
j urap out at you. The airline deregulati on has fostered the growth of new and
lower cost services. Some high cost operations have been hurt. Some may
ultimately be forced to reorganize. It ' s a harsh saying, but I think that it
needs to be said, and that is, a small number o f bankru ptcies ma.y be very
good for the hospital industry. " The fact that a hospital goes into
bankruptcy is not necessarily bad for the community it serves. The most
likely consequence of that is certainly new management, and a new working
relationship with the physicians, very possi bly a new board, and a new view of
their responsibilities and their fiduciary role .
So the idea that somehow or other that we've got to protect this industry
and not let it work its way throu gh, I woul d agree to that an in about 15 to
20 percent of the hospitals that are sole providers to the state, that is,
they're in a service area where there is no other alternative. They have an
effective mono poly. It may be tou gh to argue, and I wouldn't argue especially
long and hard, that rate review in that setting with some kind of a limit is
inappropriate, because if they are monopolists, then they may have to be
treated as such. But for the vast majority of the industry there are
opportunities to get involved, to organize . If you look at what DRGs have
done, for the first time hospitals are saying, 1 do have a stake in how that
physician practices. " And that's beginning to mean as much to them as whether
or not he's happy with the hospital and keeps his patients there. Because if
he takes a lot of patients in, but the hosptial loses money, they're worse off
than they were before. In the past the pri mary concern was basically not to
alienate. So some of these chan ges are already present.
We had put together, very bri efly, based u pon looking at Jacksonvi11e,
where a lot of things are going on, a competition senario. We had a point in
time where essenti ally we had a status quo. We're all competing with each
other and we ve got sor.1e very stong and successful cor.1panies in Jacksonvi 11 e
and in the health insurance business, and they're very active. But gradually
over time things have begun to change.
As near as I can tell, from personally working with the group, the
precipitating change is clear evi dence that HMOs are coming into the
J acksonville market. That in turn is beli evable and has caused providers to
11
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think about changing, because the HMOs have grown so rapidl y in other parts of
the state and what's happening in Orlando. And Pru-Care coming into Orlando,
I wish it were Blue Cross Care, but it's Pru-Care, has made a fundamental
change in how physicians and other think about their role and their
relationships. We have reason to believe that four HMOs are going into
Orlando in 1984. Now from that general background and that being considered
by many the most conservative part of the state raedicall y speaking, there
became a clear indication that there's going to be an HMO in - Jacksonvil l e.
And then there were going to be two, and currently there are three that are in
planning. And for a fourth one, a feasibility study is being done. Pru-Care
has recently met with the chamber, I wasn't there, they indicated they were
looking at it. Clearly we ' re l ooking at it. A proprietary group is in, the
foundation is in, with a program.
It is cl ear to everyone that the status quo is· a thing of the past. It's
not going to l ast. Now what's going to happen? Well, a group of hospitals
got together and decided that they better work a PPO. One large insurer
decided it better get a PPO going. Then another group of hospi tal s decided if
one group of · hospitals was going to get a PPO goi ng, then they better get one
going. So it now looks l ike in Jacksonvil l e there is in the planning stage,
something in the neighborhood o f seven al ternative forms of coverage other
than traditiona·1 insurance. And that has evolved essential l y over about a
one-year period. Now the earl y work for the HMOs was a three- to five-year
act. One of those PPOs has announced and is actively marketing.
We would expect in the second year, under Phase II, that there wil l be a
second PPO in that market actively sol iciting business.
We think that in the Third Phase, it would be about a two-year period
we'll see instead of "Boy, am I glad to have negotiated an arrangement ! , "
" It's a good arrangement, but I'm having a littl e problem, prices went down,
utilization went up. Let's talk some more about how we reward one another ,
how we negotiate the deal, and how we sel l it. Meanwhil e the employers have
learned, and they're buying smarter, and they're buying harder. And finally
you get to the real effecti ve price competition, which is not rate-setting per
se, that is, not price negotiation, but total cost negotiation. If they move
people out of the hospital , even though their prices are high, they're saving
us money. _So maybe they shoul d acquire a skil l ed nursing facil ity or a home
11
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health agency. Now that won ' t show up in the price they charge, but it will
show up in 1ower costs. And the reason is that they have an ·incentive to do
; t.
We see this being essentially about a four-year effort, to where you
would have widely available programs. We question that if you take into
consideratio n the prospect of litigation, the prospect of having to adapt a
Cost Contain�ent Board program to a DRG-based program, to the shake down
period that other states have experienced, to the possibility as in Conneticut
that after a few years, that the legislature wil l reorganize it. You have to
question the bet, and it is our money we're betting on behalf of our
subscribers, that th� rate regulation will outperform what we see as the
competitive alternatives.
Now there are special situations, and I think that the most notable one
is the small community. There are, I understand, some peopl e \torking on HMOs
which will breakeven at relati vely small enrollment bases. But I'm not really
sure how far along that is. And I think that ' s one of the areas, that 15 to
.20 percent of the populati on being served by the isolated hospital free from
direct competition by another hospital, that deserves more intense
consideration .
Most of these are small hospitals. Most of their costs are labor costs.
I'm not reall y sure what one would do i f one decided that - their costs were too
high. Now those of us who have been on the Hospital Cost Containment Board, I
think have an overwhelming opinion that when you ' re reviewing the budget of a
small hospital, you generally feel that they aren t getting enough and they re
not getting good treatment, because they don't know enough to protect
themselves. In the back and forth dialog where the commi s sion staff asks for
information, well, they don ' t have that, will . this do? And they ' re not really
sure what it will do. And I can't really say from a public policy standpoint,
that I believe that those hospitals will make or break health care financing
in this state. I see that as not of the highest priority, but I do see it as
important.
Let me just briefly summarize. We see in Medicare a system that has
incentives to change the physicians' behavior. We see in Medicare, the
voucher opportunity . We ' ve talked to the people in Medicare, we understand
for example they've given notice to the Maryl and rate-setting commission, that
I
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because they believe Maryland is paying more under Medicare than they would
have, that their continued authority to include Medicare payments in the
system is now being questioned. We see the voucher system, for example, in
our HMO in South Florida where we are filing for the authority to market that
to Medicare elig{bl es. We find large trade unions interested in talking about
tens of thousands of peop1e being made ava i1 ab 1 e to go into network type
programs. But we see these kinds of changes occurring no matter what the
legislature does on their side.
We think in Medicaid, just to mention some things, eliminate weekend
admissions, restrict the access to high cost hospitals for simple conditions,
pay only for . tests ordered by physicians as opposed to allowing hqspitals to
continue the practice of having standing orders. Assume if a hospi tal has an
occupancy below 60%, their reimbursement should be calculated based on some
assumptions about 60% or higher. In other words, don't pay for lack of
occupancy. There are excessive beds. We have a system that pays people and
removes the risks of building too soon, and building too much. Limit
admissions for 14 days and then recertify them with medical reviews .
These are just a small number, I don't know if that one's being done in
this state, but these are only a small number of programs. We mentioned in
previous discussi ons Michigan, for their Medicaid recipients , · selects a
primary care physician who acts as a gate keeper. These combined with
negotiations with the hospitals for the authority to serve the Medicaid
population, we think, could have tremendous leverage on the system.
So i n summary we see the need to move toward a much more competitive
marketpl ace where we're working together to try and acheive that. We don't
see any limit on our public accountability . We don't see any so-called
privileged position that this or that data or information or question
shouldn't be asked. But you do have to understand, that if because of costs
our claims costs go up, our premiums go up. We then are put in this
adversarial role. Much like the hospitals trying to get th rough that
rate-setting system. Everything depends on that, and you just don't do
�nything else.
I f it's true that the competiti ve model is emerging in many of these
forces, and many of these factors, then it would really be tragic to take
something that was very popul ar in the early 70 1 s and middle 70's and
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introduce it effectively in the middle 80 1 s. And then have to go back and
say , Gee guys , we didn't have the time to do it right , but we will find the
time to do it over. We kind of think that ' s what the issue is. We know we
need everybody 1 s help. We're proud of the acti ve , agg ressive , and I might
add , competent co_mpetition we have , but we think that keeps us on our toes.
And we think that would be good for the rest of the health care delivery and
financing industry. Thank you very much.
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